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A t 9:30 a.m. on Monday we ex pect orders from the June 27 Conference, followed by the opinions at 1 0:00 a.m. We will
begin liv e-blogging at this link at approx imately 9:1 5 . The only remaining undecided cases of the Term are Burw ell v.
Hobby Lobby and Harris v. Quinn.
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Symposium: Surprising unanimity, even more surprising clarity
A dam Gershow itz is a a Professor of Law at William and Mary Law Sc hool. He filed an amic us brief in support of Riley and Wurie.
This week the Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in Riley v. California and United States v. Wurie that forbids law enforcement
officers from searching cell phones incident to arrest without a warrant. The decision was ex actly what many commentators and Fourth
A mendment ex perts were hoping for. Nev ertheless, it was still surprising on three fronts: (1 ) the Court’s unanimity ; (2) its strong resistance
to splitting the baby and adopting a compromise position that would hav e pleased law enforcement; and (3) the sweeping language and sheer
clarity of the bright-line rule forbidding all warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest.
First, although Justice A lito authored a short concurring opinion counseling that the Court proceed with caution, the decision in Riley was
for all intents and purposes unanimous. This was a surprise to almost all Fourth A mendment ex perts and Court watchers. For ov er a
decade, Justice Scalia has taken the position that the search incident to arrest doctrine should be linked in part to whether it would be
reasonable to believ e ev idence of the crime of arrest could be found during a search. Only fiv e y ears ago – in A rizona v. Gant — the Court
adopted Justice Scalia’s position for searches incident to arrest of automobiles. The Gant decision figured prominently in the briefing of
Riley and Wurie and was discussed repeatedly during oral argument. Y et, neither Justice Scalia (nor Justices Thomas or Ginsburg, who
joined the opinion in Gant) wrote separately to endorse the Gant framework for cell phones.
This stands in stark contrast to the Court’s recent Fourth A mendment decisions about whether or not the gov ernment has conducted a
search. In the recent “Is it a search?” cases, Justices hav e written separately to adv ocate for different standards. For instance, last Term in
Florida v. Jardines, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that a dog sniff on the porch of a house was a search and pressed his v iew that the
standard should be whether there has been a phy sical trespass to property . Justice Kagan agreed with the outcome, but concurred
separately in Jardines and continued to endorse the reasonable ex pectation of priv acy test. Similarly , in the 201 2 decision in United States
v. Jones, Justice Sotomay or concurred and dropped the bombshell that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an indiv idual
has no reasonable ex pectation of priv acy in information v oluntarily disclosed to third parties.”
In light of all the jockey ing for control of the underly ing methodology of Fourth A mendment interpretation, the unanimity in Riley is rather
startling. Perhaps the reason for broad agreement among the Justices is simply that warrantless cell phone searches are so inv asiv e as to
merit their own rule. A better ex planation, howev er, might be that the case was argued in A pril – late in the Term – and that there simply
was not enough time for groups of Justices to coalesce around different, more nuanced approaches to the case. (If the short timing is the
ex planation for the clear and unanimous opinion in Riley, that suggests the Court should shorten its Term ev en further and head home in
February or March rather than June!)
The second surprise in the cellphone cases was the Court’s ability to resist the temptation to split the baby . The Riley case inv olv ed a “smart
phone,” while the defendant in Wurie was found with an older flip phone. The Court could hav e crafted a rule allowing warrantless searches
of the older technology (which is often used by drug dealers to arrange narcotics purchases), while disallowing searches of smart phones that
hold more data. The Court av oided the temptation to wade into the morass of which phones should get greater Fourth A mendment
protection.
More significantly , the Court refused to adopt the Gant formulation in which police can search without a warrant if there is reason to believ e
ev idence of the crime of arrest would be found. The Gant compromise was alluring because it appeared to restrict police searches for lowlev el crimes such as traffic v iolations while still permitting officers to search the cellphones of drug dealers and other criminals who
frequently use tex t messages to conduct unlawful activ ities. The Gant compromise was illusory , howev er, because in a digital age there is
reason to believ e ev idence of a huge number of low-lev el crimes could be found on a cell phone. In addition to tex t messages and email
correspondence, cell phones hold incriminating photos; Facebook status updates about minor offenses; Google Wallet pay ments for alcohol
that could be linked to drunk driv ing; and, most importantly , location data. Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts knew (or his law clerks or his
teenage children showed him) how clicking on his iPhone’s “Settings” icon, followed by “Priv acy ,” then “Location Serv ices,” followed by
“Sy stem Serv ices” and then “Frequent Locations” would show the ex act addresses where he had been for the last six weeks and how many
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hours and minutes he had spent at each place. This location data would be a treasure trov e of ev idence for police with suspicions or
hunches about a particular suspect. The Chief Justice thus went out of his way to note that “a Gant standard would prov e no practical limit
at all when it comes to cell phones” because “[t]he sources of potential pertinent information are v irtually unlimited.”
Once again, it is hard to say what motiv ated the Justices to reject the Gant compromise position and instead offered such robust Fourth
A mendment protection for cell phones. A fter all, the Court does not afford a fraction of the lev el of protection recognized in Riley to other
Fourth A mendment areas such as Terry frisks and automobile searches. One answer might be that it is hard for the Justices to understand
the embarrassment that comes from being subjected to a Terry frisk or an automobile search. By contrast, the Chief Justice identified a lot
of cell phone applications – “apps for Democratic Party news and Republican Party news; . . . apps for sharing pray er requests; . . . apps for
planning y our budget; apps for ev ery conceiv able hobby or pastime . . .” – that might be found on the Justices’ own phones and which they
might be embarrassed to rev eal to others. The refusal to split the baby in Riley might simply be attributable (subconsciously or not) to the
Court’s desire to protect people like them, meaning the middle class or the elite.
Finally , the Riley decision is surprising for how ironclad it appears to be. The Court announced a flat prohibition of warrantless cell phone
searches incident to arrest and seemingly left no wiggle room for future cases. In quite blunt language, Chief Justice Roberts ex plained that
“[o]ur answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to arrest is accordingly simple – get a
warrant.” A lthough the Court frequently claims to fav or bright-line rules in the criminal procedure area so as to giv e police adequate
guidance, the Court’s decisions and standards are rarely as simple and blunt as this week’s decision in Riley.
For instance, last Term in Missouri v. Mc Neely, the Court rejected a categorical rule that would hav e allowed police to conduct warrantless
blood draws in drunk driv ing cases under the theory that blood alcohol dissipates. Instead, the Court offered the completely unclear
guidance to police that “[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driv ing suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based
on the totality of the circumstances.” Concurring only in part in Mc Neely, an ex asperated Chief Justice Roberts ex plained — quite correctly
— that “[a] police officer reading this Court’s opinion would hav e no idea—no idea—what the Fourth A mendment requires of him, once he
decides to obtain a blood sample from a drunk driv ing suspect who has refused a breathaly zer test.” Y et, the Chief Justice’s own proposed
standard in Mc Neely – that ex igent circumstances ex ist if an officer could reasonably conclude that there is not time to get a warrant –
hardly seems like the hallmark of clarity .
When summarizing Fourth A mendment jurisprudence at 30,000 feet, criminal procedure professors often remark sarcastically that the
Fourth A mendment requires police “to get a warrant, ex cept when they can’t.” The clarity and bright-line nature of the decision in Riley is
therefore a breath of fresh air.
A nd unlike other Fourth A mendment decisions, it does not appear there will be much room for police to wiggle out of the rule in Riley. For
instance, after A rizona v. Gant scaled back police authority to search v ehicles incident to arrest, commentators quickly recognized that
police could conduct the same automobile searches by couching their actions under the inv entory ex ception, rather than the search incident
to arrest doctrine. In Riley, the Court notes that police can still rely on the ex igency ex ception to search cell phones without a warrant.
But, unlike the “search incident to arrest” ex ception or the inv entory doctrine, the ex igency rationale requires the police to demonstrate
probable cause for the search. Of the hundreds of warrantless cell phone search decisions ov er the last decade, v ery few could hav e been
justified under an ex igency rationale. The Riley decision thus combines sweeping language with a clear bright-line rule that police will be
unable to wiggle out of by turning to another ex ception to the warrant requirement.
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